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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout America's legal history, the members of the federal judici-
ary have attempted to faithfully uphold the laws of our nation, as established by
the Constitution and the federal legislature. Since Justice Marshall's famous
opinion in Marbury v. Madison, it has been recognized that it is the Supreme
Court's responsibility to interpret the Constitution and that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution stands as the law of the land.' This principle
was unanimously reaffirmed by the Court in Cooper v. Aaron over 150 years
later. 2 Though this principle is well-established and is, in fact, one of the long-
est-standing precedents in our nation's entire legal corpus, the problem arising
from this principle has been the manner of interpretation. This Note proposes a
solution to this problem by looking at two very divergent judicial styles, those
of Justices William J. Brennan and Antonin Scalia.3
As the body of this Note will discuss, Justice Brennan followed an un-
abashedly liberal mode of interpretation, one which often valued the result over
the method, while Justice Scalia follows a strict mode of construction, preferring
1 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
3 This Note often refers to both Justices by their last names only. This has been done to en-
hance readability and not out of disrespect to either Justice.
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the narrowest possible interpretation and placing more value in the mode of
interpretation than the particular result reached. This Note will attempt to view
the styles of both Justices with equal candor and respect while contemplating
the potential flaws in both styles with the ultimate goal of proposing a more
preferable method of interpretation that takes into account the goals of both Jus-
tices and incorporates the central purposes of the Supreme Court as an institu-
tional whole.
While Justices Brennan and Scalia find themselves on opposite ends of
the jurisprudential spectrum, both Justices' styles have been subjected to equal
amounts of criticism. 4 The most pointed criticism of Brennan's preference for
liberal decision-making and judicial activism has come in the form of proposed
legislation.5 Even judges have entered into the criticism. Alabama Supreme
Court Justice Tom Parker has recently asserted that "the liberals on the U.S.
Supreme Court .. .look down on the pro-family policies, Southern heritage,
evangelical Christianity, and other blessings of our great state," in an attempt to
convince state judges to refuse to follow Supreme Court opinion "simply be-
cause they are 'precedents.' 6 In a Wall Street Journal article, retired Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor notes that "the ubiquitous 'activist judges' who 'legislate
from the bench' have become central villains on today's domestic political land-
scape."7 The criticisms have led to dangerous territory, proposed legislation that
threatens judicial independence.8 This, of course, is undesirable, because the
Framers created the judiciary as an independent branch of government. 9
While Justice Scalia's restrictive method of construction is certainly
more preferable in light of the criticism pointed at more liberal jurists, his style
also is open to serious criticism.'0 His view is to base judicial decisions only on
4 See infra, Part II.C and Part III.C.
5 For example, South Dakota has recently proposed a state constitutional amendment that
would eliminate judicial immunity. Sandra Day O'Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence,




8 Id. The United States Supreme Court has outlined the policies behind judicial immunity on a
few occasions. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-364 (1978); see also Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. 335 (1872).
9 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. HI.
10 At least one potential criticism is that, while Justice Scalia asserts that a judge should not
decide cases based on his individual preferences, he does, in fact, decides cases in this manner.
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. HAw. L.
REv. 385 (2000); see also, andrd douglas pond cummings, Grutter v. Bollinger, Clarence Thomas,
Affirmative Action, and the Treachery of Originalism: "The Sun Don't Shine Here in This Part of
Town," 21 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 1, 62-63 (2005) (noting that Justices Thomas and Scalia both
abandon their originalist philosophies for their individual passions in the area of affirmative ac-
tion). Moreover, those attacking the Justices on the left for being too "activist" have overlooked
Scalia's own brand of activism. From the years of 1994-2000, Justice Scalia has voted to overturn
precedent 19 times, second only to Justice Thomas, who voted to overturn precedent 23 times.
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the text of the Constitution and the most relevant historical practice at the time
of its ratification." However, his method has been viewed by many as overly
restrictive,12 and his method does not allow for a decision which takes into ac-
count modem realities and sensibilities. The problem that such a narrow me-
thod of construction presents is that it often reaches overly conservative results
and sometimes places too much emphasis on majoritarian views. This ignores
the Lockean principle that government is created for the purpose, inter alia, of
preventing tyranny of the majority.'
3
This Note does not overlook the fact that the Supreme Court has gone
through its cycles of restraint and activism, just as the other branches have gone
through similar cycles. In fact, it embraces the fact. This Note, however, does
propose that neither being overly active from the bench nor being overly con-
servative in interpretation is the most preferable method of construction. Fi-
nally, it concludes that both styles contain inherent flaws subject to criticism and
that a more moderate approach to jurisprudential decision-making is preferable.
Part I deals with Justice Brennan, and Part III concerns Justice Scalia. Within
each part, Section A will outline that Justice's personal history, Section B will
outline that Justice in his own words, and Section C will focus on case law and
criticism to illustrate that Justice's style, highlighting the notable flaws and pro-
posing more moderate jurisprudential techniques that may resolve the flaws.
Part IV will then pull together these suggestions in an attempt to establish a
more preferable mode of interpretation.
HI. JUSTICE BRENNAN
A. Biography
Justice William J. Brennan was born in 1906 in New Jersey as the sec-
ond of eight children born to Irish immigrants.' 4 He got his law degree from
Harvard and entered into private practice in New Jersey.' 5 As a man of deeply-
felt commitment to family, Brennan sought a position as a trial judge in New
Jersey when he felt like his practice interfered with his family life.' 6 He as-
cended to that state's highest court by 1952, and he was appointed to the United
Lori Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist
Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENTARY 43, 65, tbl. 9 (2007). Justice Souter only voted in this
manner 7 times. Id.
n Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849,852 (1989).
12 See infra Part III.C.
13 This becomes especially problematic in Scalia's interpretation of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses. See e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 10.
14 Oyez.com, William J. Brennan, Jr. Biography, http://www.oyez.org/justices/wil-
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States Supreme Court by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956.17 Eisen-
hower later admitted publicly that the appointment of Brennan was a mistake,
presumably because Brennan turned out to be so liberal and so influential. 18
B. Brennan in His Own Words
Based on Brennan's speeches and scholarly writings, one should expect
a liberal approach to the bench that focuses more on the result than the particu-
lar method of analysis employed. This, of course, is not to say that Justice
Brennan's legal reasoning is not sound and that he does not base his decisions
on the Constitution and precedent. However, one should expect him to read the
Constitution broadly in order to protect individual liberties. In fact, Brennan
says that "our Constitution is a charter of human rights and human dignity,"' 9
and he notes that the highest accomplishments of the Court during his tenure
"were [the numerous] opinions protecting and promoting individual rights and
human dignity. 2°
At a statement given at the University of Pittsburgh in 1986, Brennan
said just that: "[t]he primary mission of us all has been and at the present mo-
ment is to preserve individual freedom-freedom of thought and action-to the
fullest extent possible., 2 ' The preservation of the individual rights to freedom,
he says, "[is] the central problem of our law today. 22 Though Brennan seems
to pay particular attention to results, he does not ignore the importance of sound
legal reasoning. In fact, he notes that "[tihe integrity of the process through
which a rule is forged and fashioned is as important as the result itself; if it were
not, the legitimacy of [that] rule would be doubtful. 23 The question, then, nec-
essarily arises as to whether such a result-oriented approach might actually fol-
low a consistent methodology.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 E. JOSHUA RosENKRANz AND BERNARD SCHwARTZ, REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE
BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE 18 (1997) [hereinafter, INFLUENCE].
20 Id. Considering the frequency with which Justice Brennan mentions human dignity and
individual rights, it appears that his chief concern would be the preservation of those concepts.
See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 671, 680 (1999) [hereinafter
Dissents]; William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO
L. REv. 3 (1989) [hereinafter Reason]; William J. Brennan, Jr., Are Citizens Justified in Being
Suspicious of the Law and the Legal System, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 981, 982 (1989) [hereinafter
Citizens]; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitu-
tions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 536 (1986) [hereinafter States];
see also William J. Brennan. Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv 761 (1961).
21 William J. Brennan, Jr., What's Ahead for the New Lawyer?, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 705, 710
(1986) [hereinafter, New Lawyer].
22 Id.
23 Dissents, supra note 20, at 679.
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With respect to that question, Brennan's approach to Constitutional in-
terpretation may be too elusive to pin down. In his confirmation hearings,
Brennan hinted at how he might approach the bench. He noted that there is a
"great deal of precedent that deals with every amendment as well as with every
provision [of the Constitution]. "24 When asked whether the Constitution should
be interpreted in accordance with its provisions and precedents interpreting
those provisions, Brennan said he did believe in that approach.25 However, he
also said that "it is part of the judicial process to consult a lot of things which
may bear upon the particular case that is before you for decision. 26 Despite his
apparent statement of fidelity to the Constitution and its prior interpretations,
Brennan also notes that "due process require[s] fidelity to a more basic and
more subtle principle: the essential dignity and worth of each individual. 27
Thus, it appears that one might expect Brennan to use the most solid reasoning
available within the traditional judicial "toolkit" to reach what seems to be the
appropriate result in each case.
Brennan, in fact, expressly rejects the historical tradition approach fa-
vored by the more "conservative" justices. Brennan notes that "the view that
the Constitution could be definitively interpreted by reference to the 'intention
of the Framers' [is] nothing more than 'arrogance cloaked as humility."' 28 In-
stead, he says the each generation must seek to establish its own balance of
power and individual freedoms "with which the Constitution is concerned. 29 In
fact, he notes that "[t]he genius of the Constitution rests not in any static mean-
ing it may have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of
its great principles to cope with current problems and needs., 30 He cautions that
we must "work hard at making ... arguments that are based on reason and ex-
perience ' 3 1 because our experience will cause "the rules that we have inherited.
to give way."32 In essence, he believes that rather than taking the historical
analysis approach we must instead restudy the Constitution in terms of our
changing realities.33
24 Roy M. Mersky and J. Myron Jacobstein, 6 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOMINATIONS, BRENNAN 37 [hereinafter, Brennan Confirmation Hearings].
25 Id.
26 Id. at 38. This is one of the qualities that really separates Justice Brennan from Justice Sca-
lia and the strict constructionalists. See infra Part III.B.
27 Reason, supra note 20, at 15.
28 William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from
the Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 313,325 (1986) [hereinafter, Adjudication].
29 Reason, supra note 20, at 22.
30 INFLUENCE, supra note 19, at 18.
31 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 331.
32 Id. at 320. Certainly, this statement reflects Brennan's preference for a more common-law-
oriented approach to interpretation.
33 New Lawyer, supra note 21, at 710.
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In defense of his preference to view the Constitution as a "living" doc-
ument, Brennan notes that times have changed drastically since that of the fram-
ers; in fact, "[iut is only within recent years that we have had occasion to think
of freedom outside the context of peace. ' 34 Aside from this basic view, Brennan
notes that it is "inescapable... that the choice by the Framers to employ general
and relativistic [terms] was a deliberate one. 35 Because of this, the Court's
views "must be subject to revision over time, or the Constitution falls captive to
,036the anachronistic views of long-gone generations. Brennan also employs a
pragmatic defense of his views noting that "if it were possible to find answers to
all constitutional questions by reference to historical practices, we would not
need judges. 37 According to Brennan, judges have a duty "to bring their indi-
vidual intellects" informed by modem realities "to bear on the issues that come
before the Court. 38 Moreover, judges are "not there simply to decide cases, but
to decide them as they think they should be decided.,
39
One might reasonably ask what principles or methods are in place to
limit the discretion of judges deciding cases solely on their personal views, es-
pecially in light of Brennan's statement that "the range of emotional and intui-
tive responses [which he calls 'passion'] to a given set of facts ... speed into
our consciousness far ahead of ... reason." 4 Brennan himself recognizes that
due process requires that "judicial determinations concerning life [and] liberty
must be based on pre-existing standards of law and cannot be left to the unlim-
ited discretion of a judge. '41 The judicial process which limits judicial discre-
tion is "principled and meaningful and . . . goes well beyond what the cynics
describe as the imposition of the judge's personal views of morality [and] pol-
icy.''42 He notes that two important checks on judicial discretion are the re-
cording of precedent and the requirement of a public and reasoned explanation
of the judicial result.43 Thus, judges are controlled by the responsibility they
have to "proceed and to persuade by reasoned argument in a public context." 44
34 Id.
35 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 325.
36 Dissents, supra note 20, at 681.
37 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 326.
38 Dissents, supra note 20, at 678.
39 Id. (emphasis added). This refers to Justice Brennan's distaste for the more mechanical
method of interpretation used by many jurists prior to Justice Cardozo's accession to the bench.
See, e.g., Reason, supra note 20.
40 Reason, supra note 20, at 9.
41 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 317.
42 Id. at 329.
43 Reason, supra note 20, at 8.
44 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 329.
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However, Brennan also warns that "formal reason severed from the in-
sights of passion" is "the greatest threat to due process principles. 45 Brennan
appears to think that such reason is inappropriate because lawyers "must bring
real morality into the legal consciousness.' He notes that government has "an
affirmative role, a positive duty to provide those things which give real sub-
stance to our cherished values of liberty, equality and human dignity. 47 Bren-
nan's deeper concern seems to be that mechanically-produced, passionless legal
decisions will not satisfactorily protect individual liberties. This is unacceptable
because "all legal decisions should advance, not degrade, human dignity."4
In fact, Brennan notes that judging cannot be "characterized as simply
the application of pure reason to legal problems, nor... as the application of the
personal will or passion of the judge., 49 Rather, it is the combination of "reason
and passion . . . [that] is central to [judicial] vitality." 50 It is these elements,
Brennan says, that a judge must consider when choosing between "basic princi-
ples" so that the decisions judges make will reflect their status as "flesh-and-
blood human beings.' In fact, the danger in perpetuating "the prevailing myth
that a judge's personal values were irrelevant to the decision process" in favor
of a purely reason-based process52 is that by "ignoring [passion], the judiciary
[will] deprive[] itself of the nourishment essential to a healthy and vital rational-
ity."
53
One would do well to recall that the central accomplishments of the
Court according to Brennan include the preservation of human liberties and dig-
nity. It is in this light that Brennan's approach-to mix passion and reason-
makes the most sense. He says,
[o]nly by remaining open to the entreaties of reason and pas-
sion, of logic and experience, can a judge come to understand
the complex human meaning of a rich term such as 'liberty,'
and only with such an understanding can courts fulfill their con-
stitutional responsibility to protect that value. 54
45 Reason, supra note 20, at 17.
46 Citizens, supra note 20, at 986.
47 Id. at 982. In essence, he seems to believe that the individuals in the three branches of the
government must breathe life into the Constitution to ensure its human elements are preserved.
48 Dissents, supra note 20, at 680.
49 Reason, supra note 20, at 3.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 5.
52 Id. at 4.
53 Id. at9.
54 Id. at 11. A healthy rationality, of course, is an important element of the judicial integrity
for which Brennan advocates. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
2008] 1271
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He argues that the judges must ensure that "official judgment always remain
human judgment"55 so that the "broadly phrased guarantees of our freedoms"
will not become "anachronism[s].",6 It is only by recognizing that our "framers
bequeathed to us a vision... of... common humanity" 57 that judges can make
decisions that "realize the true potential of our Constitution and its Bill of
Rights." 58
Justice Brennan has also spoken on what he views as the appropriate
role of state and federal power, but he also casts this discussion in terms of indi-
vidual rights. He notes that the decisions of the Court binding the states to the
Bill of Rights were highly "significant for the preservation and furtherance of
the ideals we have fashioned for our society. '59 He recognizes that the Four-
teenth Amendment has "served as the legal instrument ... protecting each of us
from the employment of governmental authority in a manner contravening our
national conceptions of human dignity and liberty." 6 This Amendment, he con-
tinues, has been interpreted "to nationalize civil rights, making the great guaran-
tees of life, liberty, and property binding on all [state] governments throughout
the nation., 61
However, Brennan notes with some regret that the Court has been in-
creasingly likely to "insure control rather than to nurture individuality." 62 In
essence, he fears that the Court has already and will continue to pull back the
reigns on individual liberty. For example, he notes that the "venerable remedy
of habeas corpus has been sharply limited in the name of federalism" and that
the "Equal Protection Clause has been denied its full reach. 63 He counters the
Court's trend with the assertion that "[a] healthy federalism is not promoted" by
allowing state officers and state courts to bypass constitutional guarantees.64
However, Brennan does agree that where state "experiments provide more ra-
ther than less protection for civil liberties and individual rights" than does the
Constitution, this experimentation should not be limited.65
55 Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
56 Id. at 12.
57 Id. at 22.
58 INFLUENCE, supra note 19, at 21.
59 States, supra note 20, at 536. Of course, these decisions are facing the most directed attack
by those who agree with Alabama Supreme Court Justice Tom Parker. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 540.
62 Id. at 546. In the battle of state power versus personal freedoms, Brennan comes down on
the side of the individual.
63 Id. at 547.
64 Id. at 541 (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
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Brennan cautions, however, that the "revitalization of state constitu-
tional law is no excuse for the weakening of federal protections and prohibi-
tions." 66 He says that this would weaken our federal system.67 He notes that
while states should be permitted to secure liberties above the floor set by the
Constitution, the federal court system serves as a "double source of protection"
when states infringe upon those liberties.68 As an example, Brennan notes that
he has always defended the collateral remedy of habeas corpus because it guar-
antees individual rights and because "it provide[s] double protection for consti-
tutional rights. 69
Justice Brennan seems to find the constitutional protections of equality
and liberty so important because the public has been pointing out "what they
regard as indefensible inequities" in our legal systems "with rising vehe-
mence."70 More troubling is the fact that the "[law is regarded as an obstacle
to, rather than an instrument of, the creation of a just and generous society. 71
He adds,
[s]ociety's overriding concern today is with providing freedom
and equality of rights and opportunities, in a realistic and not
merely formal sense, to all the people of this nation. Society is
concerned with securing justice, equal and practical, to the poor,
to the members of minority groups, to the criminally accused, to
the displaced persons of the technological revolution ... to all,
in short, who do not yet partake of the abundance of American
life.
72
He believes that, on top of that concern, "Americans expect fair play on the part
of their courts"73 and that failing to protect individual liberties against govern-
mental intrusions by the states runs contrary to this notion. While he admits that
the Court has done much "to close the gap between the promise" of the Four-
teenth Amendment "and the social and political realit[ies]" of the times,74 he
essentially argues that using federalism to limit individual remedies for viola-
tions of constitutional rights by the states will threaten the integrity of the Court.
66 Id. at 552; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
67 States, supra note 20, at 552.
68 Id. at 550, 552.
69 William J. Brennan, Jr., Preface, Nineteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 19 Ann.
Rev. Crim. Pro. xiii (1990).
70 Citizens, supra note 20, at 981.
71 Id. at 982.
72 Id. at 983 (emphasis added).
73 Brennan Confirmation Hearings, supra note 24, at 23.
74 States, supra note 20, at 546.
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This belief seems to inform Brennan's view that "the Fourteenth
Amendment fully applied the provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights to the
states, thereby creating a federal floor of protection" that should be used to de-
termine whether states have violated constitutional rights.75 In fact, he notes
that "state courts... [had] handed down over 250 published opinions [between
1970 and 1984] holding that the constitutional minimums set by the United
States Supreme Court were insufficient to satisfy the more stringent require-
ments of state constitutional law., 76 Thus, he seems to argue that, even though
state courts agree that the rights under the Constitution provide the bare mini-
mum protections of liberty and equality, the federal courts must still intervene
when states do not meet these minimums. He seems to view this role as the duty
of the federal courts, and he seems to find that this duty is vital to the integrity
of the court system because, after all, "[t]he mechanism by which society makes
choices and accommodates conflicting social interests has always been preemi-
nently the law.",7 7 The United States Supreme Court, then, must step in and pull
knowledge from all disciplines to "investigate and report on the functioning and
nature of society 'M to ensure that, when society does codify its collective policy
choices into the law, individual liberties and equality are accommodated.
In summary, one should expect Brennan's opinions to utilize the most
logical form of reasoning he can in order to arrive at his preferred result. That
result will likely best promote the protection of individual liberty, equality, and
human dignity. He will likely use strongly passionate discourse and stylized
language to ensure that the "Constitution intervene[s] to provide [a] cloak of
dignity '79 for the individual whose constitutional rights have been violated. One
should expect Brennan to utilize a case-by-case approach which provides the
necessary "flexibility with respect to the call of stare decisis °80 to ensure that
individual rights are protected. One should also expect more forward-looking
opinions-that is, arguments based on the future effects of one outcome versus
another-filled with a "certain idealism.., of what the law can and must be."
81
One should not expect to find a discernible method of reasoning that Brennan
continuously employs because it is likely that he will use the most solid legal
analysis possible to reach the result that does the most to protect individual
rights-a result Brennan would seemingly have in mind before he begins to
reason through the facts and law. The following section will show that, for the
75 Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 548.
77 Citizens, supra note 20, at 985.
78 New Lawyer, supra note 21, at 709.
79 INFLUENCE, supra note 19, at 19.
80 Dissents, supra note 20, at 681.
81 Adjudication, supra note 28, at 318-19.
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most part, Justice Brennan does appear to be mostly result-oriented 82 and that he
does seem to interpret individual rights in the broadest manner reasonable given
the text and history of the Constitution.
C. Case Law and Criticism
Justice Brennan's opinions display that his legal reasoning was sound-
at least when each case is viewed in isolation. However, by looking at his col-
lective body of Supreme Court opinions, one can conclude that Brennan had no
discernibly consistent jurisprudence. His contradictions are too numerous.
While the results achieved during Justice Brennan's tenure are at least remark-
able and at best admirable, his lack of consistency is somewhat problematic with
respect to how solid a precedential value his decisions might have over the next
few decades. This section will analyze those inconsistencies-as well as other
criticisms of Justice Brennan's opinions-to the extent necessary to show that a
more moderate jurisprudence might have been preferable in comparison.
In a panel discussion conducted at New York School of Law to address
the question of whether the Brennan legacy would endure, all four panelists-
Akhil Reed Amar, Robert Nagel, Mark Tushnet and Richard Fallon-agreed on
at least one point; they noted that Brennan's contributions to American jurispru-
dence must be analyzed with an appropriate understanding that Brennan's ten-
ure on the court began at a time when the social programs instituted during
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "New Deal" were beginning to take hold.83
Amar stated that, before Brennan, the picture of constitutional law was much
different. 84 Prior to Brennan's tenure, the first ten Amendments were rarely
invoked (and never were they referred to collectively as the "Bill of Rights").85
Because of Brennan, Amar asserts, "we can consider the Bill of Rights our pal-
ladium of liberty, our Parthenon., 86 The thrust of Amar's argument appears to
be that Brennan's greatest legacy is twofold: first, that he elevated the Court to
the position it now occupies as the arbiter between governmental power and
individual rights; second, that he greatly expanded what rights the Court pro-
tects against governmental authority. 87 Richard Fallon clarifies this argument
82 This is not to say that Justice Brennan will not utilize solid legal reasoning in his opinions.
He does, after all, stress the importance of such reasoning as a limit of judicial discretion. This is
merely to say that it does appear in many cases that Justice Brennan appears to work backwards
from the result. That is, he appears to employ various methods of legal reasoning to fit his desired
result. See infra Part II.C.
83 See generally, Panel Discussion, Will the Brennan Legacy Endure?, 43 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
177 (1999) [hereinafter, Legacy Panel].
84 Id. at 178.
85 Id. at 178-79. This Note assumes, arguendo, that Amar's assertion is factually sound.
86 Id. at 179.
87 Id. at 177-81. Certainly, this is a defensible position, especially with respect to the latter
contribution. However, as this Section shows, many argue that Justice Brennan stretched those
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by noting that "[a]s power gathered at the center [during the New Deal], Justice
Brennan wanted to make sure that individuals' rights were protected. 88 Even
Nagel, an admitted critic of Justice Brennan, 89 seems to think that Justice Bren-
nan's influence on the Supreme Court's role was positive.
All of this, at first blush, seems to provide reason to praise, not criticize,
Brennan's jurisprudence. From this, it may be argued that the "liberal activ-
ism"90 Brennan brought to the Court was exactly what the Nation needed during
his tenure. However, Tushnet raises the opposite view. He notes that "[t]o the
extent that... Brennan's vision.., depended on the New Deal order, the disap-
pearance of that order would have to be fatal."91 He notes further that this vi-
sion, and the gains made during his tenure as a result of that vision, have not
been adequately protected for the future.92 Tushnet and Nagel both note that
"judicial retrenchment" on the progressive doctrines established during Bren-
nan's tenure has taken place during the Rehnquist era.93 Nagel, in fact, argues
that much of what Brennan had accomplished would have already been chipped
away had the Rehnquist court developed the same "intellectual confidence" that
Brennan possessed. 94 In light of Brennan's own assertion that public confidence
in the judiciary is one of the primary purposes of elevating human dignity, lib-
erty, and equality to such a high plateau, such retrenchment would seem espe-
cially problematic.95
To that point, many of the criticisms of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence
are especially noteworthy. In another panel discussion at the New York School
of Law, Michael McConnell and Stephen Reinhardt both question whether
Brennan's apparently "unfettered authority" to impose his own views might
inspire Justices Thomas or Scalia to do the same and impose their own, more
conservative views upon the Nation.96 In fact, Justice Kennedy expresses this
rights too far. In other words, he did not strike the appropriate balance between the individual and
the government.
88 Id. at 189.
89 Id. at 186.
90 This Note does not use the terms "liberal" or "activist" in the manner which seems to domi-
nate the legal scholarship in this area. It does not attach the negative connotations that often ac-
company these terms, nor does it view liberal activism unfavorably. For a thoroughly nuanced
analysis of the contours of judicial activism, see Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activ-
ism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENN. L. REV. 567 (2007).
91 Id. at 188 (emphasis added).
92 Legacy Panel, supra note 83, at 188 (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 185-89. This retrenchment is likely to continue-and perhaps even accelerate-
during the Roberts era.
94 Id. at 183-84. Justice Scalia, in fact, may provide just the sort of confidence about which
Nagel was speaking.
95 See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
96 Panel Discussion, Brennan's Approach to Reading and Interpreting the Constitution, 43
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 41, 63 (1999) [hereinafter Approach Panel]. In fact, one could argue that
Justices Thomas and Scalia already do impose their own views upon the Nation. cummings,
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very concern in Chauffers v. Terry when he says, "If we abandon the plain lan-
guage of the Constitution to expand the jury right, we may expect Courts with
opposing views to curtail it in the future."'9 This statement was made in re-
sponse to Brennan's concurring view that the court should abandon the histori-
cal analysis that had been a constant part of the Court's Seventh Amendment
98jurisprudence. Kennedy's statement, therefore, can be supported by the plain
language of that Amendment.
99
The obvious concern is that if Brennan could successfully abandon the
text of the Constitution to broaden the scope of recognized rights, then more
conservative jurists could do the same in the future. Much of the scholarship
written about Justice Brennan focuses on the assertion that perhaps Brennan's
view of which rights are constitutionally protected was too subjective. For ex-
ample, Donna Coltharp notes that Brennan's view in this regard is informed
largely by "natural rights" theory.'1 ° She notes that natural law, a phrase found
nowhere in the Constitution, is "hopelessly subjective."' 0'° Moreover, according
to Coltharp, "Brennan's gift of compromise, a gift nearly essential to effective
jurisprudence from an extremist judge, inevitably produced vulnerable prece-
dent."' 02
In addition, Coltharp argues that Brennan's use of natural rights theory,
along with his gift of compromise, has led to unclear decisions---especially with
regard to his First Amendment jurisprudence. 0 3 Kevin Driscoll illustrates this
criticism by focusing on Brennan's decision in Jencks v. United States."" In
Jencks, the court was faced with a defendant who was charged with perjury for
lying about his affiliation with the Communist party. 0 5 The court held that "the
criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of
privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce... relevant statements
supra note 10, at 61-63 (noting specifically that Justice Thomas' decisions are influenced, in part,
by his own background and preferences).
97 494 U.S. 558, 593 (1990). This is, in fact, a real danger considering the fact that Justice
Scalia, who had been writing as a dissenter during most of the early portion of his career, may
now "emerge as a leader of the new conservative majority." See David G. Savage, Supreme
Court's New Tilt Could Put Scalia on a Roll, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2007, at Al.
98 494 U.S. at 574.
9 The Seventh Amendment reads, in pertinent part, "In Suits at common law... the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved[.]" U.S. Const. amend. VII (emphasis added).
'o Donna F. Coltharp, Writing in the Margins: Brennan, Marshall, and the Inherent Weak-
nesses of Liberal Judicial Decision-Making, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 23 (1997).
101 Id. at 25
102 Id. at 45. This aggravates the concern that, though Justice Brennan made positive gains
while on the court, the stability of his legacy may be in jeopardy because of the manner in which
he made those gains.
103 Id. at 37.
104 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
105 Id. at 658-59.
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or reports in its possession."' 06 Driscoll notes that the opinion is subject to criti-
cism because Brennan's "language was so broad and generalized that the lower
courts at once began to interpret it in various ways."' 0 7 The fact that Brennan's
opinions can sometimes present interpretive difficulties presents problems with
his goal of integrity. 0 8 If troubling language is used in the identification of a
right that is supposedly protected by the Constitution or by federal law, then it
becomes that much more difficult to protect that right. Certainly, this cannot be
what Brennan had in mind when he noted that the Court's role is to protect indi-
vidual liberties and human dignity. 1°9
Scholars have also criticized Brennan's jurisprudence on two related
grounds: first, that the holdings are often "less-than certain" and the results are
often "fact-specific"" 0 and, second, that Brennan consistently twisted the facts
in order to reach his desired result."' As an example of the latter, Driscoll
points to Irvin v. Dowd. 12 In that case, the defendant was tried for committing
six murders." 3 His constitutional claim was that due process would be violated
because of the publicity surrounding his trial. 1 4 The Indiana Supreme Court
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial in part because he had escaped
from prison in the interim." 5 Essentially, the court had to decide whether it had
jurisdiction over the federal habeas action. 116 The issue was complicated. If the
Court found that the state denied the motion for a new trial solely on the state-
law grounds that the prisoner had escaped, then it had no jurisdiction for federal
habeas review; if, however, the Court found that the decision was really based
on the constitutional due process issue, then jurisdiction was proper. 17 The
Court ultimately found that the Indiana Supreme Court had rested its decision
on the constitutional issues, and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction over the
habeas petition." 8 However, the Indiana Supreme Court clearly rested on the
fact that an escaped prisoner "is not entitled during the period he is a fugitive to
any standing in court or to file any plea or ask any consideration from such
106 Id. at 672.
107 Kevin O'D. Driscoll, The Origins of a Judicial Icon: Justice Brennan's Warren Court
Years, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1012 (2002) (citations omitted).
108 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
n1 Coltharp, supra note 100, at 39.
"II Driscoll, supra note 107, at 1016.
112 359 U.S. 394 (1959).
113 Id. at 396.
114 Id. at 397-98.
115 Id. at 402.
116 Driscoll, supra note 107, at 1015.
"7 Id. at 1015.
118 Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959).
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court." 19 Any mention of the constitutional claims by that court became dicta
at that point. Thus, the criticism that Brennan "twists facts and words at [his]
pleasure in order to reach the results [he] wants"' 12 0 seems well-grounded, espe-
cially given Brennan's position on federal habeas relief.1
2 1
At least one scholar points out two criticisms of Brennan's jurispru-
dence related to his vision of human dignity. Stephen Wermiel notes that some
find Brennan's "vision of human dignity ...self-serving."' 22 Wermiel gives
two examples of such criticism: first, pro-life scholars criticize Brennan for
overlooking the human dignity of the unborn fetus when upholding a woman's
right to an abortion procedure; second, other scholars criticize Brennan for using
the First Amendment to protect against unwanted and hateful speech, claiming
that this does not advance human dignity in the sense of the community.
23
Wermeil also notes that some criticize Brennan by asking just where "one finds
the standards of human dignity to apply" when deciding which rights to protect
under the Constitution.' 24 Both of these criticisms, if valid, diminish the integ-
rity of Brennan's decision-making process because they show that he will bend
his reasoning in order to reach a particular result, and this reflects and solidifies
the position taken by Justice Kennedy in Chauffers v. Terry.
25
These criticisms only scratch the surface. The contradictions noted be-
low will show that Brennan's approach does, in fact, seem self-serving. Col-
tharp points out one of these inconsistencies in Brennan's death penalty juris-
prudence.126 Coltharp notes that in Furman v. Georgia, Brennan argues that
"national consensus was against the death penalty," and, therefore, it should be
considered unconstitutional under the Eight Amendment. 27 In Gregg v. Geor-
gia, however, "when confronted with evidence to the contrary... Brennan as-
serted . . . that he would continue to oppose the death penalty on the principle
that the punishment degraded human dignity, a proposition which was largely
119 Irvin v. State, 139 N.E.2d 898, 901 (1957).
120 Driscoll, supra note 107, at 1016 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreward: The Time Chart of
the Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 110 (1959).
121 See supra note 69 and accompanying text; see also Mark Tushnet, Justice Brennan, Equal-
ity, and Majority Rule, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1357, 1357-60 (1991) (examining how Justice Brennan
similarly twists facts to reach his desired result in Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990)).
122 Stephen J. Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM.
& MARY BtiLL OF RTS. J. 223, 236-37 (1998).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 237. This criticism, of course, is really just a restatement of those criticisms that at-
tack Justice Brennan for his reliance on natural law theory to articulate the scope of rights that are
constitutionally protected. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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derived from natural rights theory."'' 28 These cases, read together, show that
Brennan is willing to rest on different grounds in order to arrive at the result he
feels is appropriate-a result grounded in natural rights theory, which, as men-
tioned above, is criticized for being too subjective. This does seem to show
that Brennan employs legal reasoning to advance his own views.
In addition, Coltharp notes that Brennan's "explicit[] and implicit[] em-
brace[] [of] the natural rights strand of natural law theory" is not grounded any-
where in the text of the Constitution.1 30 Thus, his decisions resting on natural
rights theory cannot stand on solid ground when they are not supported by the
text.
However, Brennan has no problem strictly adhering to the text when it
yields the result he would prefer. For example, Coltharp also notes that Brennan
"consistently dissented" from the Court's decisions in Eleventh Amendment
cases and that he "clearly had the textual argument won.' 31 Again, to the ex-
tent that he is attempting to reach what he considers the appropriate result,
Brennan's jurisprudence appears self-serving.
A comparison of City of Newport v. Fact Concerts'32 and Teague v.
Lane'33 provides another example of Brennan's inconsistent jurisprudence. In
Fact Concerts, the Court faced the question of whether "a municipality may be
held liable for punitive damages under [42 U.S.C. § 1983]." 134 However, the
respondent argued that, because the City of Newport did not object to the giving
of jury instruction allowing for punitive damages to be awarded against the city
before the jury retired to consider its verdict, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51
barred appeal of the punitive damages issue. 135 The majority, however, over-
looked Rule 51's requirements and reached the merits of the issue, 136 deciding
that punitive damages may not be awarded against a municipality. 137 Justice
Brennan, however, dissented on the ground that Rule 51 clearly bars considera-
tion of the issue.' 38 Here, Brennan takes what this Note considers the moderate
128 Id.; see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 230-31 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
130 Coltharp, supra note 100, at 43.
131 Id. at 42. For a more thorough discussion of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see infra
notes 244-54 and accompanying text.
132 453 U.S. 247 (1981).
133 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
134 453 U.S. at 249.
135 Id. at 255-56. In this case, the court cited a relevant portion of the then-existing rule: "No
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto
before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and
the grounds of his objection." Id. at 255 n.9.
136 Id. at 256.
137 Id. at 271.
138 Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1280 [Vol. 110
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss3/11
BRENNAN V. SCALIA
approach, deciding the case on the narrowest grounds available. However, one
could at least speculate that, given Brennan's views on the Court's role of pro-
tecting individual rights against governmental intrusion, 39 he did not want to
reach the merits because he did not agree that punitive damages could not be
awarded against municipalities.
However, in Teague, Justice Brennan would have it the opposite way;
here, he would give the Court broad discretion to decide a substantive issue
where the Court might have dismissed the action without so deciding. In Tea-
gue, the Court was presented with the issue of whether its prior rule that the
Sixth Amendment requires a jury venire to represent a fair cross section of the
community should be extended to the petit j ury.' 4° This question was brought
before the Court on appeal from the denial of petitioner's writ of habeas cor-
pus. 41 The Court held that it could not reach the merits of the constitutional
question because "the rule urged by petitioner should not be applied retroac-
tively to cases on collateral review."'' 42 The Teague majority followed the same
approach Brennan took in his Fact Concerts dissen; the majority avoids decid-
ing the substantive issue on procedural grounds. Brennan, however, dissents
from this approach in Teague, saying that the Court should reach the merits of
petitioner's constitutional claim.14 3  Here, one could easily assume-given
Brennan's position concerning the remedy of habeas corpus-that he advocates
this approach based on his own personal views. 44 Thus, the inconsistency be-
tween his reasoning in Fact Concerts and Teague illustrates how Brennan's
jurisprudence can be seen as self-serving.
It appears, then, that Justice Brennan's approach is undesirable with re-
spect to his own goal of integrity. The inconsistencies in his jurisprudence-
when viewed as a cohesive whole-show that he is willing to twist facts or
change his methodology to reach his desired result. This leads to the problem
that it might open the gates for a Justice with more conservative views to also
use transparent, subjective methodologies to reach the opposite results. Accord-
ing to Brennan's own view, this is undesirable because the liberties he protected
in order to advance the integrity and legitimacy of the Court are found within
precedents that do not stand on solid ground. 145 A more moderate approach
would seek to do the opposite. A Justice using this approach would take the
long-view and seek to protect his results into the future, so opposing voices can-
not overcome these decisions so easily.
139 See supra Part II.B.
140 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 292 (1989).
141 Id. at 293.
142 Id. at 299.
143 Id. at 329 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144 See Brennan, supra note 69 and accompanying text.
145 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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1Il. JUSTICE SCALIA
A. Biography
Justice Antonin Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey, in 1936 as an
only child. 146 He was a second-generation American with an Italian upbringing,
and he has a strong dedication to Catholicism. 47 He received his law degree
from Harvard Law School and entered into government service shortly thereaf-
ter.148 In 1982, he was appointed by President Ronald Reagan to the D.C. Court
of Appeals, where he gained a reputation for judicial restraint and limited inter-
pretation. 149 This reputation followed him when he was appointed to the United
States Supreme Court in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan to fill the void cre-
ated when Justice William Rehnquist was appointed Chief Justice.1
50
B. Scalia in His Own Words
According to Scalia's confirmation hearings and his own scholarly writ-
ings, one would expect him to take a conservative approach to the bench. Clear-
ly, Scalia established early in his career that he is a proponent of 'originalism,'
which means that he prefers to adhere to the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion. 15  In one essay, Scalia cites to Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Myers v.
United States152 as a "prime example of... the 'originalist' approach to consti-
tutional interpretation."' 53 Scalia notes that this approach is preferable because
the judge should seek to establish the meaning of the Constitution in 1789 by
looking to the text of the Constitution, its overall structure, and the "contempo-
raneous understanding" of the framers. 154 Scalia, however, distinguishes his
approach from that of a strict constructionist. He explains that a text "should
146 Oyez.com, Antonin Scalia Biography, http://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin-scalia (last
visited Feb. 22, 2008).
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. It is arguable whether his brand of judicial interpretation is really a practice in restraint.
See infra Part III.C.
150 See infra Part III.C.
151 See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CN. L. REv. 849 (1989)
[hereinafter Originalism]; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1175 (1989) [hereinafter Rule of Law]; Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil
Law System: The Role of Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 3 (1997) [hereinafter Interpretation]; Roy M.
Mersky and J. Myron Jacobstein, 13 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1982 142 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia Confirmation Hearings].
152 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
153 Originalism, supra note 151, at 851-52.
15 Id. at 852.
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not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be
construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means."'155 Scalia also distin-
guishes original meaning from original intent. 56 Scalia explains that the dis-
tinction minimizes the importance of legislative history as an interpretive device
because it is the meaning of the Constitution or of a statute that is important, not
the intent of the drafters.157 In fact, he notes that "if somebody should discover
that the secret intent of the framers was quite different from what the words
seem to connote, it would not make any difference."'
' 58
Scalia frequently juxtaposes his preference for originalism with the
more liberal approach he calls "nonoriginalism.", 59 This approach is favored by
those who advocate "The Living Constitution. '"1 60 The fundamental flaw of
nonoriginalism, he says, is that it is incompatible "with the very principle that
legitimizes judicial review of constitutionality."' 161 Nonoriginalists, he contin-
ues, read the Constitution as merely a "novel invitation to apply current social
values"; however, he questions whether such an invitation would be aimed at
the courts rather than the legislature.' 62 Scalia also questions the sources from
which judges should draw these fundamental values that replace original mean-
ing: "the philosophy of Plato, or of Locke, or Mills, or Rawls, or perhaps from
the latest Gallup poll.' 63 In sum, Scalia views the primary problem with non-
originalism to be the impossibility of "achieving any consensus on what, pre-
cisely, is to replace the original meaning, once that is abandoned."'
64
In fact, Scalia has viewed nonoriginalism skeptically since before his
confirmation. During his confirmation hearings, for example, Scalia notes that
he worries that by following the approach of the nonoriginalists, that he is not
reflecting the fundamental beliefs of society but rather the "most deeply felt
beliefs of Scalia, which is not what I want to impose on the society."06 Scalia
continues
I am deeply mistrustful of my ability, without any guidance
other than my own intuition, to say what are the deepest and
most profound beliefs of our society. And that's what it means
155 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 23.
156 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 142.
157 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 29-30. But see Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note
151, at 159 (Scalia says that legislative history is "a significant factor in interpreting a statute").
158 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 202.
159 Originalism, supra note 151, at 862.
160 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 47.
161 Originalism, supra note 151, at 854.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 855.
164 Id. at 862-63.
165 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 183.
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to say that something is constitutionally required. It is in accor-
dance with the deepest and most profound beliefs of our soci-
ety. I find it difficult to come to the conclusion that something
qualifies for that description when neither at the time the consti-
tutional provision in question was enacted, was it in fact the
practice of the society, as demonstrated by the laws the society
enacted, nor at the present time is it that way.'
66
Scalia constantly ponders the problem "that the judges will mistake their own
predilections for the law" 167 throughout his writings.
Another facet of the problem with nonoriginalism to Scalia is that this
approach does not comport with his view of the separation of powers doctrine.
In fact, he attacks the common-law case-by-case approach, saying that this
would be "an unqualified good, were it not for a trend in our government...
called democracy."'' 68 He explains that the problem with a nonoriginalist view
is that general rules under this approach do not have "a solid textual anchor,"
and, as a result, such rules appear "uncomfortably like legislation."'' 69 Scalia
was so concerned that judicial interpretation would replace the legislative proc-
ess that he advised Congress during his confirmation hearings that "the more
specific Congress can be, the more democratic the judgment is, because if Con-
gress is not specific, the judgment is made by the courts, and the courts are not
democratic institutions. 17 °
This criticism and advice stems from Scalia's theoretical view of the
function of the Constitution. He says, "[t]o a large degree, [the Constitution] is
intended to be an insulation against the current times, against the passions of the
moment that may cause individual liberties to be disregarded, and it has served
that function valuably very often."' 17 1 In fact, Scalia notes that a democratic
society does not "need constitutional guarantees to insure that its laws will re-
flect 'current values.""172 Instead, Scalia believes that the Constitution's pur-
pose is to protect against such changes in values that the society "adopting the
Constitution [thought] fundamentally undesirable."'' 73 This concern is best re-
flected when Scalia says
[The nonoriginalist approach], of course, is the end of the Bill
of Rights, whose meaning will be committed to the very body it
166 Id. at 195.
167 Originalism, supra note 151, at 863.
168 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 9.
169 Rule of Law, supra note 151, at 1185.
170 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 135.
171 Id. at 142-43.
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was meant to protect against: the majority. By trying to make
the Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to age,
we shall have caused it to do nothing at all. 174
A related concern, according to Scalia, is that, just as nonoriginalists have used
this method of interpretation to expand on freedoms in the past, nonoriginalists
can use the same method of interpretation to contract these freedoms in the fu-
ture.175 Moreover, because Justice Scalia views the Constitution in this manner,
he takes the need for "theoretical legitimacy" very seriously.1
76
Scalia has also written and spoken on the specific methods of interpreta-
tion he prefers. To Scalia, the specific method of legal reasoning that a judge
sets out seems to be the most important facet of his job. In fact, Scalia says,
"the rule of law is about form,"'17 7 and "whether the right party won is really
secondary."' 78 For him, the first step is to discover the original meaning of the
Constitution or of a statute during the time of the drafters. 179 Scalia pledges to
"adhere closely to the plain meaning of the text.' 80 He will attempt to find the
original meaning of the text by establishing an "historical criterion" separate
from his own preferences.'18 When attempting to interpret the text, he claims to
construe the words to have a meaning fairly within the "limited range of mean-
ing" that those words have.' 82 Further, Scalia will only use the writings of Ham-
ilton and Madison in The Federalist Papers to the extent that these writings help
show how the "text of the Constitution was originally understood."
83
Of course, Scalia will not go through this analysis in each case. Where
a particular issue has already been decided-in whole or in part-by the court,
he will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis.184 This comes with a caveat,
however, because he also notes that a persuasive argument might convince him
to overrule a prior decision of the court.' 85 Moreover, Scalia will not necessarily
stick to a plain meaning analysis in all cases. Where a circumstance arises that
was not within the contemplation of the framers, he will attempt to resolve the
issue in the way which would "most comport with the application of that clause
174 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 47.
175 Originalism, supra note 151, at 855.
176 Id. at 862.
177 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 25 (emphasis in original).
178 Id. at 6.
179 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 202.
180 Rule of Law, supra note 151, at 1184.
181 Originalism, supra note 151, at 864.
182 Interpretation, supra note 151, at 24.
183 Id. at 38.
194 Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 126.
185 See, e.g., id. at 132.
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to the circumstances that did exist at the time."' 86 It is in this area that Scalia
will look not only to text, but also to legislative history and policy considera-
tions.1
87
This method of interpretation, according to Justice Scalia, is designed to
help ensure the development of general rules, which he feels are important due
to the nature of a legal system "in which the Supreme Court can review only an
insignificant proportion of the decided cases.' 88 It is important to Scalia that
the Supreme Court fosters predictable results in the lower federal courts.'
89
To summarize Scalia's apt description of his interpretive method, it
seems one should expect him to decide a Constitutional issue in the following
manner. He will first look to the text of the Constitution and attempt to glean
from it the original meaning of the particular clause governing the case. Then,
he will look to prior Supreme Court decisions to determine whether the issue
has been decided in whole or in part. If the prior decisions cannot be reconciled
with the text, then he will overrule the prior case to the extent necessary. Fi-
nally, if the Constitution does not specifically speak to the issue, then he will
attempt to determine from the Constitution as a whole and from the framers'
contemporaneous understanding of the Constitution what the most appropriate
result should be.
C. Case Law and Criticism
While Justice Scalia seems to adhere closely to his "original meaning"
method of interpretation, his tenure on the bench has not come without contra-
diction. This Section highlights those contradictions to show that a more mod-
erate approach to Constitutional interpretation might be not only more prefer-
able than Scalia's approach, but also more realistic than Scalia's justifications
for using that approach.
Erwin Chemerinsky argues that the fundamental flaw in Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence is that, while "pretend[ing] that [his] decisions are a result of a
neutral judicial methodology,"'' 90 Scalia actually makes the same value choices
he has argued that a Supreme Court Justice should not be making.' 9' The fun-
damental problem in such an approach is that, "as a result[,] his value choices
are not defended"; 92 instead they are hidden behind a conservative approach
that explicitly disclaims the making of such choices.
186 Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
187 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 511,515 (1989).
188 Rule of Law, supra note 151, at 1178-79.
189 Id.
190 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 385.
191 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. See also, cummings, supra note 10, at 65.
192 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 385.
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Chemerinsky questions Scalia's assertion that he is not engaging in val-
ue judgments by pointing out several areas in which Scalia's jurisprudence leads
to results remarkably consistent with his own conservative personal ideology in
areas such as affirmative action, abortion rights, school prayer, state sovereign
immunity, and in condemning unwed mothers and fathers. 193 In fact, Scalia's
jurisprudence "leads one to believe that the original meaning of the Constitution
and the Republican platform are remarkably similar."' 194 Indeed, as shown be-
low, most of Scalia's critics have gone to great lengths to point out the inconsis-
tencies not only in Scalia's jurisprudence as a whole, but also between his me-
thod of originalism and some of the results he has reached during his tenure.
David Schultz points out that, although Scalia's approach tends to sup-
port the theory that the Court should generally defer to the political process,
Scalia's record, in fact, "demonstrates that he has selectively used judicial pow-
er to support those interests and groups which he favors at the expense of those
he does not." 195 Schultz goes on to cite a number of examples in which Scalia
exhibits deference to state and federal legislatures.' 96 Then, he makes the argu-
ment that Scalia sometimes contends that courts can second-guess the political
process, especially when "policy decisions [can be viewed] as nothing more
than pressure politics."'
197
The best support for the argument that Scalia, despite his assertions to
the contrary, defers to legislatures in a preferential manner lies in his decisions
on affirmative action. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency 98 (where Scalia
dissented on the grounds that he would hold the affirmative action program
dealt with in the case unconstitutional), he "describes the origin of preferential
treatment programs as residing in pressure politics."' 199 Scalia has, in fact, "con-
demned affirmative action."2° David Boling points out that Scalia's views on
193 Id. at 391-92.
194 Id. at 392. Lest it be forgotten, one should recall that Scalia was appointed by President
Ronald Reagan, a staunch Republican. See supra text accompanying note 150.
195 David Schultz, Scalia on Democratic Decision Making and Long Standing Traditions: How
Rights Always Lose, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 319, 331-32 (1997). In fact, Scalia has voted to in-
validate federal statutes thirty times between 1994 and 2004, making him the third most-frequent
Supreme Court Justice to do so within that period. Ringhand, supra note 10, at 49.
196 Schultz, supra note 195, at 332-37. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992); Rutan v.
Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Ore. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
197 Schultz, supra note 195, at 337.
198 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (dealing with the question of whether affirmative action programs are
valid under the Constitution).
,99 Schultz, supra note 195, at 337; see also Johnson, 480 U.S. at 677.
200 James G. Wilson, Justice Diffused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with
the Views of Five Conservative, Academic Judges, 40 U. MiAMI L. REv. 913, 914 (1986). Justice
Scalia has also written in the area of affirmative action in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
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affirmative action are deeply personal in that they were informed by Scalia's
own heritage as an Italian immigrant.2 1 Chemerinsky also notes this contradic-
tion and adds that Scalia cannot even justify his disapproval of affirmative ac-
tion based on original meaning because "there is overwhelming historical evi-
dence that affirmative action was widespread around the time that the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted. '' 202 Scalia joined in the majority opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,203 in
which the Court effectively held that employing racial classifications in school
enrollment can rarely, if ever, survive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2°
One point that the critics have consistently attacked concerns Scalia's
use of long-standing tradition. Schultz notes that "[imn every instance which
Scalia has appealed to historical tradition, he has ruled against the recognition of
a right or has supported the majoritarian political process against a claim of dis-
* ,,205crimination. Interestingly, David Zlotnick even notes that despite Scalia's
preference for "textual fidelity," he cannot draw this conservative approach
from anywhere in the Constitution.206 In fact, Zlotnick seems to suggest that the
relevant historical tradition would run contrary to Scalia's jurisprudence because
the common law, case-by-case approach was unquestioned at the time of the
Constitution's ratification.2°
Some of the scholars that have attacked Scalia's jurisprudence on this
front have said that Scalia sometimes either severely misinterprets or completely
abandons historical practices.20 8 One scholar has said that Scalia's use of his-
torical practices is not even a part of his originalism; rather, the scholar sug-
gests, Scalia uses this method merely as "damage control" to limit the court's
488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Here, he concurred because he refused to
accept the majority's proposition that "state and local governments may in some circumstances
discriminate on the basis of race in order... 'to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination."' Id.
at 520.
201 David Boling, The Jurisprudential Approach of Justice Antonin Scalia: Methodology over
Result?, 44 ARK. L. REv. 1143, 1150-53 (1991). Boling takes this personal view from an early
article written by Scalia before he joined the Supreme Court. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as
Cure: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race, " 1979 WASH. U. L.Q.
147 (1979). This point assumes arguendo that Scalia's judicial opinions on affirmative action are
informed by his personal views and not his readings of the Constitution.
202 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 392; see also, cummings, supra note 10, at 46-47.
203 __ U.S. - 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
204 Id.
205 Schultz, supra note 195, at 343.
206 David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's Fidelity to
His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1382 (1999).
207 Id. at 1398-99.
208 Id. at 1413-17.
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previous substantive due process cases.209 Further, while Scalia claims that his
approach is preferable because it constrains a judge to the text of the Constitu-
tion and, therefore, restrains a judge from forcing his own judgment upon the
people, 1 ° some scholars have noted that Scalia's use of historical tradition actu-
ally provides little, if any, "constraint on his decision-making.
2 1
While these scholars have argued that Scalia, in fact, does incorporate
his own value judgments into his decision-making process, they have also ad-
dressed a potential weakness in that argument. Both Chemerinsky and Zlotnick
address the result reached in Texas v. Johnson,212 in which Scalia voted to hold
that the flag-burning statute questioned in the case was unconstitutional.2 3
Zlotnick, however, argues that some of Scalia's "opinions are self-consciously
drafted to make clear that they contradict his personal politics. '214 In addition,
Chemerinsky notes that he cannot "think of a single instance since the early
1990s in which Justice Scalia seemed to follow his interpretive methodology in
a constitutional case where it would lead to [anything] other than the conserva-
tive result.,
21 5
On the other hand, Scalia supporters seem to focus on his opinions "de-
fending a criminal defendant's rights against the power of the state. 216 Barkow,
for example, cites to Scalia's opinions in four primary areas-the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial, the Sixth Amendment's right
to confrontation, the interpretative preference that ambiguous criminal statutes
be construed in favor of a criminal defendant, and the procedural guarantees
granted to criminal defendants even in times of war and terror.21 7 However, the
picture of Scalia's jurisprudence in the area of criminal law and procedure has
not been as bright as Barkow may like to think.
209 David B. Anders, Justices Harlan and Black Revisited: The Emerging Dispute Between
Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia over Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 895,906-07 (1993).
210 See supra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
211 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 399; see also Schultz, supra note 195, at 345.
212 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that a Texas statute criminalizing the burning of the American
flag was unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
213 Zlotnick, supra note 206, at 1423; Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 394-95.
214 Zlotnick, supra note 206, at 1424. This Note does not endorse this particular argument
because it implies bad faith on the part of Justice Scalia. Moreover, it looks into his inner though-
ts, a place into which no scholar can claim to have enough insight to confidently make such a
statement. This Note also recognizes that Zlotnick does not specifically adopt this position either.
Rather, he argues that since Scalia has a known agenda to promote his methodology, then no study
of Scalia should overlook the fact that it might be the case that Scalia would intentionally sign on
to more "liberal" opinions. Id.
215 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 395.
216 Rachel E. Barkow, Tribute to Justice Antonin Scalia, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 15, 16
(2006). Barkow was a law clerk to Justice Scalia in 1997-1998.
217 Id. at 16-20.
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Barkow cites to Hamdi v. Rumsfela 18 to support the fact that Justice
Scalia finds that criminal defendants have all of their procedural guarantees dur-
ing times of war and terror.219 However, Justice Scalia has spoken on the topic
covered by the court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 20 saying that "detainees [do not]
have rights under the U.S. Constitution because '[w]ar is war, and it has never
been the case that when you captured a combatant you have to give them a jury
trial in your civil courts.' 22' In addition, Scalia has consistently voted that the
Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of the death penalty against either
the mentally retarded or criminal defendants under the age of eighteen.2 22 It is
in these cases that some of Justice Scalia's contradictions start to come to light.
A brief comparison of Stanford v. Kentucky223 and Atkins v. Virginia224
will highlight the fact that Scalia sometimes picks and chooses between what
methods he finds important to an outcome and what methods he finds unimpor-
tant. In Stanford, Scalia addressed the argument that the enactment of a federal
statute providing for capital punishment for some drug-related crimes by of-
fenders at least 18 years old helps show that the national consensus was that no
person should be executed if under the age of 18.225 Scalia says that
even if it were true that no federal statute permitted the execu-
tion of persons under 18, that would not remotely establish-in
the face of a substantial number of state statutes to the con-
trary-a national consensus that such punishment is inhumane,
218 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 Barkow, supra note 216, at 19.
220 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006)
221 Michael Isikoff, Supreme Court: Detainees' Rights-Scalia Speaks His Mind, NEWSWEEK,
April 3, 2006, at 6. Bear in mind that this extra-judicial comment was made on March 8-twenty
days before oral arguments on the case were made. Scalia dissented in Hamdan, saying that the
court had no jurisdiction to hear the case under Detainee Treatment Act. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2810-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The distinction between Hamdi and Hamdan, of course, is the
distinction between a citizen and an "enemy combatant." This Note views the distinction as un-
important to this point because some procedure should still be in place to make the initial deter-
mination of an individual's status as an enemy combatant.
222 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607-630 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337-54 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989) (abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. 551).
223 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (dealing with the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohib-
ited execution of criminals who were convicted of crimes committed before the defendant reached
the age of eighteen).
224 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (dealing with the question of whether the Eighth Amendment prohib-
ited execution of mentally retarded criminals).
225 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 372-73.
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any more than the absence of a federal lottery establishes a na-
tional consensus that lotteries are socially harmful.2 26
What is telling is that, in Atkins, the court was presented with the argument that
Congress, when enacting legislation to reinstate the federal death penalty, spe-
cifically provided that no execution "shall ... be carried out upon a person who
is mentally retarded. 227 In this case, where the federal statute could not possi-
bly help Scalia in his dissent, he completely ignores it.
228
Of course, this brand of "picking and choosing" is what Scalia criticizes
the majority for doing in Roper v. Simmons.229 More disturbing to a cohesive
view of Scalia's jurisprudence as a whole is that Scalia criticizes the majority
for overturning a decision just fifteen years old.230 However, Justice Scalia pro-
poses to do just that in his line of opinions dealing with the abortion cases. In
his concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,231 Scalia
flatly states, "I share Justice Blackmun's view [that a portion of the majority's
opinion] effectively would overrule Roe v. Wade" and continues, "I think that
should be done, but [I] would do it more explicitly. 232 Just sixteen years had
passed since the initial opinion in Roe that held that the right to privacy pre-
vented state bans on abortion.233 Continuing down the line of subsequent abor-
tion cases, Scalia affirms this position in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey234 and then calls for the overruling of Casey Oust eight
years after it was decided) in Stenberg v. Carhart.2 35 Yet, Scalia would contend
that he does not make value judgments as a judge-that he is not, in fact, pick-
ing and choosing when to follow stare decisis and when to discard it based on
his preferred outcome.236 This contradiction is even more explicit in Lawrence
226 Id.
227 536 U.S. 304 at 314.
228 Id. at 337-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229 543 U.S. 551, 616-17 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). This case also dealt with the question
of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited execution of criminals who were convicted of
crimes committed prior to the age of 18; the court overruled Stanford and held that the Eighth
Amendment did prohibit such executions. Id. (majority opinion).
230 Id. at 607-08.
231 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
232 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973)).
233 Roe, 410 U.S. 113.
234 505 U.S. 833, 982 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
235 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236 This becomes even more clear when one considers that Scalia has made public, extrajudicial
statements to the fact that he believes Roe v. Wade should be overturned. See Scalia Debates
Friend Who Heads ACLU, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 16, 2006, at A4. Moreover, Scalia
contradicts himself by making these statements as he explicitly declines to address the question of
whether he would vote to overrule Roe during his confirmation hearings based on the fact that he
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v. Texas.237 Simply put, where stare decisis serves Scalia's personal preferences,
he adheres to it; where it does not, he will not hesitate to overturn precedent.238
The problem lies in the fact that Scalia specifically disclaims the use of value
judgments by judges.239
As noted in the preceding subsection, Scalia believes that rules formu-
lated by the court should have a "solid textual anchor"'24° and that Constitutional
interpretation should be limited to all that its words fairly mean.24' In other
words, if an issue was not contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, then
the resolution of such issue should be left to the legislative processes of the
states. Scalia follows these principles strictly when it comes to the substantive
due process cases.242 However, one can ask why Scalia's strict adherence to the
plain meaning of the Constitution is not followed in the state sovereign immu-
243
nity cases.
In fact, in this area of law, Justice Scalia himself admits that a state's
right to be free from suit by its own citizens is not supported by the Constitu-
tion. He says, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu-
cation Expense Board,24 though the "precise terms [of the Eleventh Amend-
ment] bar only federal jurisdiction brought against one State by citizens of an-
other State or foreign state, we have long recognized that [it] accomplished
much more. 2 45 The Court had adhered to extra-textual interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment since its landmark decision in Hans v. Louisiana, in
which the Court found that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against a state
by its own citizens. 246 Scalia does not question that court's reasoning; nor does
he attempt to justify his reliance on Hans by anything other than a respect for
thinks it inappropriate that he would be viewed as having a less-than impartial view on the matter.
Scalia Confirmation Hearings, supra note 151, at 131.
237 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dealing with the constitutionality of a Texas
statute that made it criminal for homosexuals to engage in sexual conduct). Here, Scalia says,
"'Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.' That was the Court's sententious response,
barely more than a decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe v. Wade. The Court's response
today, to those who have engaged in a 17-year crusade to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick is very
different."' Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
238 Recall that Justice Scalia has voted to overturn precedent more times than all but one of his
Rehnquist Court colleagues. See Ringhand, supra note 10, at 64-65.
239 See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
240 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
242 See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953-56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979-1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part); Webster v. Re-
prod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532-37 (1989) (Scalia J., concurring).
243 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 392-94.
244 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
245 Id. at 669.
246 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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stare decisis. However, in the abortion line of cases, Scalia criticized the major-
ity's tendency to ignore whether a decision was "wrong ... on its face" when
determining whether stare decisis should be disregarded.2 47 Yet, according to
Scalia's own jurisprudence, Hans was wrong when it was decided. As Chemer-
insky notes, "he obviously cannot base [his reliance on Hans] on the text of the
Constitution."2 48  Yet, Scalia consistently joins the majority in reaffirming
Hans, 49 even though the text of the Eleventh Amendment only applies to suits
against states by citizens of other states or foreign states.250  The result with
which Scalia concurs cannot be reached by the text alone; instead, the Justices
must resort to materials beyond the text to reach the holding announced in Hans.
Scalia's jurisprudence in this area of the law is contradictory because it
seems to violate his strict adherence to original meaning and because it seems to
counter his strong belief in clear separation of powers.25' In Hans, the Court
was clearly concerned with the fact that Chisholm v. Georgia252 yielded such a
quick response by Congress and the states in passing the Eleventh Amend-
ment. 3 The notion that Congress and the states might have had a similar re-
sponse had the Court allowed the suit to proceed seems, in large part, to have
driven the result. However, the Court could, among other things, be criticized
for overstepping its role in that it played the part of Congress by reading the
amendment to bar this suit. Yet, Justice Scalia never mentions or addresses this
argument in any of his opinions in the area of state sovereign immunity. Where
is his faithfulness to the plain, original meaning of the Constitution, and where
is his belief in a strict separation-of-powers doctrine?
All of the contradictions in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence noted above
point to the fact that perhaps Chemerinsky is correct to argue that Scalia does, in
fact, base his decisions on his own value judgments.254 The most fundamental
247 Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 982-83 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
248 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 392.
249 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Pennsyl-
vania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44).
250 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State[.]" Id. (emphasis added).
251 For an example of Justice Scalia's view of separation of powers, see Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Here, Scalia says that "[t]he Framers of the
Federal Constitution ... viewed the principle of separation of powers as the absolutely central
guarantee of a just Government." Id. at 697.
252 2 U.S. 419 (1793) (holding that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear diversity cases against
the states) (superseded by statute, U.S. CONST. amend. Xl).
253 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). The Eleventh Amendment was passed just
during the first meeting of Congress after Chisolm was decided. Id. at 11.
254 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 385. The author of this Note adopts the position of Chemer-
inksy that he is "not criticizing Justice Scalia for making value choices in deciding cases." Id. at
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problem, however, is that such prominent contradictions bring into question the
theoretical legitimacy of Scalia's methodology. This, of course, points to the
most severe contradiction of all-that Scalia himself takes the need for such
legitimacy very seriously. 5 Perhaps what makes Scalia's jurisprudence so con-
servative is the very fact that he denies making value choices. Even if he were
still to reach the same conservative results, a more moderate jurisprudence
would clarify and defend such results by resorting to pragmatic considerations.
Some of the problems inherent in Scalia's methodology can be seen on
the surface of what Scalia purports to do. He says that he neither construes text
strictly nor liberally; rather, he construes a text to contain all that it reasonably
means. 256 Moreover, when text is ambiguous, he refers to long-standing tradi-
tion and the historical practices in place at the time the Constitution was
adopted. Both of these methods, however, ignore the fact that two judges
could use precisely the same method and reach very divergent results.258 What,
then, leads to the difference between the judges' results? The answer lies out-
side the text and in the personal preferences of the judges.
Kamp argues that Scalia's method is flawed mostly because it does not
have a place for judicial creativity.259 He argues that Scalia's opinion in Burn-
ham v. Superior Court26° suffers as a result of lack of creativity and a misappli-
cation of tradition in the realm of personal jurisdiction.261 Chemerinsky argues
that Scalia's conservative methodology would have led to the opposite result the
court ultimately reached in Brown v. Board of Education.262 He notes that the
same Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment also passed statutes al-
lowing for segregation in the D.C. school districts.263 While no one can say with
certainty that Scalia would have dissented in Brown, it does seem highly plausi-
ble, given his conservative methodology.
However conservative his methodology might be, it must be noted that
Scalia's jurisprudence has, at least, approached moderation at times. In addi-
tion, he has used his jurisprudence in a few instances to reach what his more
liberal observers would consider the appropriate result. For example, Scalia
395. The problem does not lie in the making of value choices but rather the disclaimer that he
does not make such choices when he, in fact, does.
M5 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
256 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
258 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 399.
259 Allen R. Kamp, The Counter-Revolutionary Nature of Justice Scalia's "Traditionalism," 27
PAC. L.J. 99,111 (1995).
260 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
261 Kamp, supra note 259, at 101-02.
262 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 398; see Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
263 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 398.
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wrote for the majority in Kyllo v. United States,264 in which the court held that
the Fourth Amendment prevented police officers from using a thermal imager
without a warrant to detect the amount of heat produced in a home.265 Here,
Scalia explicitly holds that the Fourth Amendment protects the rights of indi-
viduals to be free from unreasonable searches in their homes. While the court
debated over whether or not this was a search, Scalia held that any method po-
lice officers used to gain intimate details of the home that could not be ascer-
tained without sense-enhancing technology constituted a search.266 The only
aspect of the opinion that keeps it from being moderate is that he admits the
court must adopt a rule that "take[s] account of more sophisticated systems that
are already in use or in development., 267 This approach sounds remarkably fa-
miliar to an argument one might expect Justice Brennan to make-that a rule
will or will not lead to potentially disastrous results in the future.268
In Thornton v. United States,269 Scalia concurred in the judgment that
the Fourth Amendment does not protect an individual from a warrantless search
of his car subsequent to an arrest even when that individual is first approached
by the police when he is outside of the car, but he strongly rebukes the court's
reasoning.270 While the majority's rationale was based on the fact that an officer
should be given reasonable discretion to protect his safety,27' Scalia says that
this rationale does not apply with the same force where the apprehended indi-
vidual is handcuffed in the back of the squad car.272 Scalia, instead, chooses to
rest his judgment on the more moderate and more realistic proposition that it is
the officer's interest in the acquisition of further evidence of the crime for which
the suspect was apprehended.273 The only thing keeping Scalia's approach from
being characterized as moderate is the fact that this argument was not raised in
the lower courts nor was it addressed by the parties during oral argument-a
fact that O'Connor cites in her concurrence.27 4
264 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
265 Id. at 40.
266 Id. at 34.
267 Id. at 36.
268 The dissent squarely addresses this point and criticizes Justice Scalia for adopting a rule that
is, in part, based on future applications of the Fourth Amendment to advancing technology. Id. at
42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
270 Id. at 625-32 (Scalia, J., concurring).
271 Id. at 623.
272 Id. at 625.
273 Id. at 629.
274 Id. at 624-25 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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IV. JUSTICE OR JURISPRUDENCE? A MODERATE PROPOSAL
Thus far, this Note has attempted to show that both Justices' approaches
to the bench are subject to criticisms from opposite ends of the spectrum. Ulti-
mately, this Note proposes that a more moderate approach is preferable to both
the overly-conservative and the outwardly-liberal approaches examined above.
In general, Brennan's jurisprudence is flawed because it focuses too much on
result, and Scalia's jurisprudence is flawed because it focuses too much on me-
thodology.275 In essence, the perfect, moderate judge would endeavor to find
the appropriate result within well-established modes of interpretation and juris-
prudence.
A. What Does it Mean to be "Moderate"?
In order to properly advocate for a moderate jurisprudential philosophy,
the term moderate, as this Note applies it, must be properly defined. Of course,
such a broad term can be elusive of general definition. As Coltharp recognizes,
"what is moderate [or] centrist ... changes, and a society comes to demand dif-
ferent protections from its government and its founding document., 276 This
statement, however, assumes that the terms "moderate" and "centrist" focus on
the results reached by a judge. This Note does not make this assumption; in-
stead, this Note advocates for moderate jurisprudence-which, in itself, takes
into account the result. The result reached, in other words, is only of marginal
import to this definition.277 Moderation, in short, is the balanced application of
text, case law, pragmatism, and policy to the facts of a particular case in order to
reach a result that makes sense when applied to real scenarios.
What exactly, then, does a moderate judge look like? A moderate judge
should focus, of course, on the facts of the case before him. He should then
look to the entire body of law that applies to the case and view that body of law
as a continuing tradition of which he is only a part. A moderate judge should
interpret the text of the Constitution and the Court's precedents in a reasonable
manner-that is, neither too broadly nor too narrowly. Account should be taken
of all the objective understandings allowed by the text, and the moderate judge
should look to determine whether precedent has squarely addressed how the text
might or should apply to the case at hand. If precedent cannot satisfactorily
determine the approach that should be taken, then the judge should adopt the
understanding of the text that takes the middle ground between the most broad
275 See supra Parts II.B and III.C. This Note recognizes that this characterization of Justices
Brennan and Scalia is somewhat limited in scope. However, the approaches are so characterized
solely for the purpose of illustrating what a more moderate approach might look like.
276 Coltharp, supra note 100, at 46.
277 In other words, the definition of moderation advocated by this Note should be viewed dif-
ferently than a more "numerative" definition of moderation. Moderation in jurisprudence should
appear the same no matter what the era and no matter what the result.
[Vol. I1101296
32
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 110, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol110/iss3/11
BRENNAN V. SCALIA
and most liberal interpretations. However, such an approach should not be
overly formalistic. An approach should also take into account the facts of the
case and determine which result would best comport with the overall spirit of
the Constitution and its protections and dictates.278 Here, the judge should also
take into account any pragmatic factors which may cut in favor of a particular
result.
A moderate judge should pay equal attention to the past traditions of the
law, the present case before the judge, and the future implications of his deci-
sion. He should seek to rest his holdings on the firmest grounds available so
that his decision is not quickly overturned by a subsequent decision. The
judge's decisions should neither be framed in an overly-broad nor in an overly-
narrow manner. Equal attention should also be paid to the following aims of the
Court as a whole: legitimacy, predictability, and longevity.2 79 Finally, a moder-
ate judge should only seek to overturn precedent on one of the following occa-
sions: first, when the prior case the judge seeks to overrule was wrongly-
decided,28° or, second, when the prior case lays down a rule that has become
completely unworkable.28' Moreover, when overturning precedent, a moderate
judge should seek to overturn that decision only to the extent necessary to prop-
erly decide the case before him.
While the above definition does not address all aspects of a judge's ju-
risprudence, it, at least, provides a useful starting point through which a moder-
ate approach can be examined. The following section illustrates this approach
by analyzing some of the cases explored in the preceding sections in this light.
Moreover, it will look more closely at the criticisms of Justices Brennan and
Scalia, and it will show how this approach proposed above allays some of these
concerns.
B. A Moderate (and Modest) Illustration
It seems that there are at least two common threads running through the
discussions above. First, both Brennan and Scalia view reasoning as impor-
tant.282 Second, both Justices seem to pick and choose between the methods that
278 This approach should take place after the judge first decides whether the questions pre-
sented by a particular case are aptly resolved by the text and precedent. It should be utilized only
if such sources do not yield a clear answer-which, admittedly, is most often the case.
279 Longevity, in this context, refers to the desire a moderate judge should have that his deci-
sion stands as precedent for as long as can be reasonably expected.
280 When overturning precedent on this ground, it must be clear that the prior case was wrong-
ly-decided.
281 Again, when overturning precedent on this ground, it should be clear that this is the case. It
is preferable that the rule or method laid down by the prior case has been given ample time to
work itself out. That is, a moderate judge would not overturn precedent on this ground when its
rule has only been given a few years to work. This determination, after all, should be made ac-
cording to real experience.
282 See supra Part II and Part III.
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best suits their desired results.283 However, there are some useful distinctions to
be made to help illustrate why both Justices' approaches are undesirable com-
pared to a more moderate jurisprudence. While both Brennan and Scalia do
view the reasoning as an important part of the decision-making process, and
while it appears that both Justices seem to share the view that reasoning is im-
portant because it furthers the goal of legitimacy, the two depart on their views
of what legitimacy entails.284
Justice Brennan seems to view legitimacy as being closely intertwined
with the integrity of the Court-and the integrity of the Court is closely related
to the public's view of how well the Court protects individual liberties.285 Jus-
tice Scalia, on the other hand, seems to view legitimacy more in the abstract,
and he finds legitimacy to be linked closely with predictability. 286 However,
both Justices' views seem to be at odds with what a more moderate approach
might look like.
A more moderate Justice would have the concerns of legitimacy, integ-
rity, and predictability in mind. However, as shown above, both Justices Bren-
nan and Scalia seem to pick and choose between methodologies in their reason-
ing in order to achieve their desired results.287 With respect to this problem,
Brennan's approach seems preferable because he at least admits that he places
value on human dignity and liberty and, therefore, does value the results.288
However, Brennan's approach, to the extent that it relies on subjective natural
law principles, does nothing to foster predictability. Moreover, as argued above,
289this approach runs counter to the concern for longevity. In addition, the fact
that his legacy has been questioned based on the fact that his decisions do not
stand on solid ground290 militates against long-term predictability because vul-
nerable precedent leads to the potential result that this precedent will be over-
turned.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia's resolution of these concerns does no
better in terms of moderation. While he does not seem to rest any of his deci-
sions on wholly subjective grounds such as natural rights theory, his methodol-
ogy has been so inconsistent that it raises serious questions as to whether Scalia
really does ignore the result, as he claims. 29' This raises the concern with le-
gitimacy as Brennan has framed it because, as Chemerinsky argues, Scalia's
results and subjective views, while being imposed in the name of originalism,
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
286 See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
287 See supra Part I.C and Part HI.C.
288 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
291 See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text.
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never get defended.292 It even raises concerns with legitimacy as Scalia views it
because his method is still subject to the personal views of the decision-maker.
As noted above, the moderate approach would seek to resolve these
problems by using a formulaic and practical methodology.293 For example,
moderate jurisprudence would not rely on such subjective theories as natural
law theory. Moreover, a moderate judge would view the potential results in a
case and squarely address both the positive and negative repercussions of each.
He would then advocate for the result which is most reasonable considering not
only applicable text and precedent but also pragmatic considerations. By doing
this, a moderate judge would foster all three goals-legitimacy, predictability
and longevity-much better than do the individual approaches of Justices Bren-
nan and Scalia.
In order to further illustrate what a moderate approach might look like,
it would be useful to look at some cases already on the books. Take, for exam-
ple, Lawrence v. Texas.29 4 In that case, the majority struck down a Texas statute
which made it illegal for two persons of the same sex to engage in sexual con-
duct.295 The majority held that this violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 296 sparking a vehement dissent by Justice Scalia.297 How-
ever, in order to hold that the statute was unconstitutional under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it had to hold broadly that this violated
substantive due process. 298 This entailed the Court's having to address and
overturn its prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick that homosexuals do not have
a fundamental right to engage in sodomy.299
However, as Justice O'Connor notes in her concurrence, it would have
been more preferable to rest this decision on the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.300 This would have accomplished several things. First,
it wouldn't have required the Court to overrule Bowers. Second, it would have
allowed the decision to rest on more solid ground.3°' Under established Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, a statute that makes a distinction between two
classes of people similarly situated is constitutionally suspect.30 2 While the
292 Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 385.
293 See supra Part IV.A.
294 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
295 Id. at 563.
296 Id. at 578-79.
297 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 564.
299 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558).
300 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
301 As it stands now on substantive due process grounds, the majority is really hanging by a
thread. This makes the precedent set by the case vulnerable, leading to the same problems dis-
cussed above with respect to Brennan's jurisprudence. See supra Part II.C.
302 See generally Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (overruled on other grounds).
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Court has never directly held that homosexuals are a suspect class, it is not a far
jump from a strand of jurisprudence running through the Equal Protection deci-
sions-that which makes classifications based on immutable characteristics
303constitutionally suspect. Under this approach classifications based on immu-
table characteristics--"those determined solely by the accident of birth ''30-
must be "assessed under the most stringent level of review. 30 5 In other words,
unless there is a highly persuasive reason for the state to make this distinction,
then such statutes "always violate the Constitution.,,306 The Court could then
have instructed the parties to focus arguments on whether homosexuality is real-
ly an immutable characteristic.
A decision based on these grounds has much more support by prior
precedent that did the majority's opinion in Lawrence. It also would have been
decided on much more narrow grounds than under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Certainly, an immutable characteristics analysis is
much less subjective than the natural law theory packed within the Lawrence
majority's analysis. Finally, it would have been much less of an intellectual
leap to decide the case on these grounds. A decision on these grounds would
have furthered all three goals with which a moderate Justice should be con-
cerned-legitimacy, predictability, and longevity. It would have advanced le-
gitimacy because it would have been well-grounded in prior case law; such a
decision would have fostered predictability because it would have given future
litigants a distinct framework within which to work; and it would have fostered
longevity because it would have made sense on a pragmatic level.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps moderation is only the ideal and not the reality. However, it is
more likely that an opinion written in a more moderate tone which takes into
account the proper result for the case at hand and reaches that result based on
sound legal reasoning grounded in the text of the Constitution, prior Supreme
Court decisions, and pragmatic concerns will create more solid precedent than
one that either focuses completely on the result or one that absolutely ignores it.
While there is no doubt that the Court, as a whole, goes through cycles of "lib-
eralism" (i.e., the Warren Court) and "conservatism" (the Rehnquist Court), an
individual judge should consider that the opinion he issues, whether it com-
mands a majority of the Court or not, will be read for years to come. Therefore,
the moderate judge should take seriously the duty to ground opinions as firmly
as he can in constitutional text. The moderate judge should also ensure that his
303 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 477 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring); Ful-
lilove, 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 360 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
304 Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
305 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
306 Michael M., 450 U.S. at 478 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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conclusion is the most sound resolution possible. This is, in fact, the true nature
of moderation-unabashedly taking into account both result and reason, and
giving each its equal due.
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